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PROPERTY-LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HAB-
ITABILITY IN RESIDENTIAL LEASES-The Pennsylvania Superior Court
has held that the principle of caveat emptor is no longer applicable
to residential leases and that an implied warranty of habitability,
with its requisite contract remedies, will now apply to all such
leases.
Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
In November, 1971, appellant Holmes rented a residential dwell-
ing based on a month-to-month oral lease from appellee Pugh.,
However, because of numerous defective conditions which allegedly
rendered the leased premises uninhabitable and posed health and
safety threats to her and her two minor children, Holmes ceased to
make monthly rental payments from September, 1975, through
April, 1976.2
Consequently, Pugh filed an assumpsit action against Holmes
before a justice of the peace, seeking possession of the leased dwell-
ing and recovery in the amount of the unpaid rent.' After Pugh
obtained a judgment for possession and unpaid rent, Holmes filed
a notice of appeal4 with the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin
County requesting possession and unpaid rent.5
Holmes filed an Answer Containing New Matter. As a defense,
she raised a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, alleging
that since September, 1975, Pugh had failed to maintain her dwell-
1. The dwelling was located in Chambersburg, Franklin County. Monthly rent was sixty
dollars.
2. Holmes alleged defective conditions that included a leaking roof, lack of hot water,
cockroach infestation, leaking pipes, and hazardous steps and floors. Pugh v. Holmes, 384
A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
3. This action for possession and unpaid rent was actually the second action filed before
a justice of the peace by Pugh against Holmes. In the first action, Pugh requested and
received judgment for unpaid rent only.
4. Holmes had also appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County after Pugh
received a judgment for unpaid rent in the first action.
5. Upon receiving notification of Holmes' appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Frank-
lin County, Pugh filed his complaint in the same court pursuant to Rule 1004B of the Pennsyl-
vania Rules of Civil Procedure for Justices of the Peace. See 384 A.2d at 1237. Pugh had also
filed a former complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County pursuant to Rule
1004B upon receiving notification of Holmes' appeal from the judgment Pugh had received
in the prior action. Id. Rule 1004B directs that if the appellant was the defendant in the action
before the justice of the peace, he must file, with his notice of appeal, a praecipe requesting
the prothonotary to enter a rule as of course upon the appellee to file a complaint within 20
days after service of the rule or suffer entry of a judgment of non pros.
6. See 384 A.2d at 1237.
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ing in a sanitary and healthful condition.7 Holmes also alleged she
had given notice to Pugh of the defective conditions, but that he had
failed to repair them despite a reasonable opportunity to do so.8
Holmes maintained that as a result of Pugh's breach of an implied
warranty of habitability, her obligation to pay rent to Pugh was
relieved and she was neither responsible for past rent nor obligated
to relinquish possession of the premises.' In addition, Holmes as-
serted a counterclaim for costs incurred in repairing the defective
conditions that Pugh had failed to repair after receiving notice of
the defects.'0
Pugh demurred to Holmes' defense and counterclaim. The Court
of Common Pleas of Franklin County sustained Pugh's preliminary
objections and entered judgment in his favor for possession, rent,
and costs." Holmes then appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania, which reversed and remanded the lower court's decision.'"
Judge Jacobs, writing for the majority, initially discussed
landlord-tenant law, with its adherence to the principle of caveat
emptor, as a vestige of an agrarian society that had failed to keep
pace with changing social conditions." He observed that with few
7. Id. The implied warranty of habitability places a duty on the landlord to repair certain
kinds of defects arising or discovered during the lease term when the defects render the leased
premises uninhabitable. The term "habitable" has not yet been fully defined, and the process
of definition appears to be proceeding on a case by case basis. For a list of the conditions
that Holmes alleged violated the implied warranty of habitability, see note 2 supra. For a
list of the states that have set out habitability standards by statute, see note 49 infra.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The counterclaim requested reimbursement for costs incurred to repair a broken
front door lock and other defective conditions.
11. 1 Franklin County L.J. 8 (1977). The court found for Pugh, reasoning that Holmes
failed to set forth a valid defense or a valid cause of action. The court noted that Pennsylvania
is essentially a common law state where caveat emptor remains the law. Recognition of an
implied warranty of habitability would establish a new social policy which the court believed
was a legislative rather than a judicial function. Finally, the court believed that the Courts
of Common Pleas of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania simply do not have the manpower
resources, technical knowledge, or time to inspect, investigate, and enforce landlord-tenant
relationships that involve questions of habitability.
12. Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). In a 5-1 decision, the case was
remanded to provide Holmes with an opportunity to prove a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability. Pugh has appealed the decision of the superior court to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.
13. Id. at 1237-38. During the sixteenth century, landlord-tenant relationships developed
in a primarily agrarian society in which the underlying land was the focal point of the
relationship. The principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) governed the transaction
and meant that the tenant must inspect the premises and judge for himself. Once he took
possession of the leased premises, the tenant assumed the risk of quality and condition unless
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exceptions,'4 courts had continued to adhere to sixteenth century
landlord-tenant rules. Noting the inadequacy of these exceptions to
alleviate the harsh effects of caveat emptor, the court determined
that it was time for Pennsylvania to join a growing number of juris-
dictions that have decided that today's tenants must be afforded a
greater degree of protection. Therefore, to restore a balanced
landlord-tenant relationship, the court concluded that caveat emp-
tor must be rejected and an implied warranty of habitability
adopted.' 5
In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Jacobs reviewed several fac-
tors that had contributed to the development of a trend toward the
adoption of the implied warranty of habitability in Pennsylvania.
Initially, he observed that for decades Pennsylvania courts had pro-
vided remedies for tenants whose landlords breached express cove-
nants in leases. 6 He also noted that consumers have been protected
he had bargained for express warranties from the landlord. The agrarian tenant was assumed
to be a "jack of all trades" who could make any necessary repairs, capably maintain the
leased premises, and bargain at arm's length with his landlord.
On the other hand, today's tenant is primarily interested in housing and services. He is
not a "jack of all trades" who is capable of inspecting and repairing in a multi-dwelling
apartment complex, and most importantly, the housing shortage has taken away his equal
bargaining position. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), where the court held that a warranty of habitability must be
implied by operation of law in all leases. The court discussed at length the drastic changes
that have occurred in the landlord-tenant relationship, and the importance of the common
law's recognition of these changes.
14. 384 A.2d at 1238. The doctrine of constructive eviction is one of the exceptions to
common law landlord-tenant principles that courts have recognized. Constructive eviction
occurs when the landlord, with no intention of ousting the tenant, commits some act which
renders the premises substantially unsuitable for the purpose for which they were leased, or
substantially interferes with the tenant's beneficial enjoyment of the premises. The doctrine
of constructive eviction requires the tenant to abandon the premises, effectively limiting its
value to most tenants who often find it impossible to quickly locate other habitable housing
in the current housing shortage. See King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 69-70 (Mo. App.
1973); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 429, 462 P.2d 470, 472, reh. denied, 51 Hawaii 478
(1969). See also Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 248, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). InIngalls, the Massachu-
setts court found a warranty of fitness for immediate use when a furnished dwelling was
rented temporarily or for short periods of time. The court reasoned that because the tenant
is renting the furnished dwelling for only a short duration, both parties reasonably contem-
plate that the tenant expects to receive a dwelling to which he will not be required to devote
time to repair.
15. 384 A.2d at 1239. For a list of jurisdictions that have rejected caveat emptor and
adopted an implied warranty of habitability, see note 39 infra.
16. Id. See McDanel v. Mack Realty Co., 315 Pa. 174, 172 A. 97 (1934) (Pennsylvania
Supreme Court treated a lease with express covenants as a contract and applied contract
principles to remedy a breach). See also text accompanying notes 53-54 infra.
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by the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a partic-
ular purpose in the buying of goods since the 1950's.'7 Furthermore,
in 1968, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Section 357 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 8 which imposed liability on a
landlord who had breached a contract to repair the rented prem-
ises. 9 Another significant event in the development of this trend was
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision construing Pennsyl-
vania's Rent Withholding Act 0 as constitutional.2' Shortly there-
after, in Elderkin v. Gaster,"2 the Supreme Court adopted an im-
plied warranty of workmanship and habitability in those situations
where new houses are sold by builder-vendors. Judge Jacobs empha-
sized that the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law2 3 had been extended to include residential leases in
Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties."4 Finally, the court
noted that an implied warranty of habitability had been adopted
17. 384 A.2d at 1239. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 2-314, 2-315 (Purdon 1970) (originally
enacted as Act of April 6, 1953, Pub. L. No. 3, §§ 2-314, 2-315, reenacted as Act of Oct. 2,
1959, Pub. L. No. 1023, § 2).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torrs 357 (1965). Section 357 provides that the lessor is
liable for physical harm caused by a condition of disrepair existing on the land before or
arising after the lessee has taken possession if the lessor breached an express covenant to
repair, thereby creating an unreasonable risk.
19. 384 A.2d at 1239. See Reitmeyer v. Spreecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968) (in
adopting RErATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRT § 357, the court noted several policy considera-
tions, such as the inferior bargaining position of today's tenants and the housing shortage,
which other courts had relied upon to justify the implied warranty of habitability).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon Supp. 1976-1977). The Rent Withholding Act,
which applies only to first, second, or third class cities of the Commonwealth, suspends a
fenant's duty to pay rent when his dwelling is certified as unfit for human habitation by the
local code enforcement agency. If the dwelling is certified as unfit, the tenant is obligated to
pay his rent into an escrow fund. If the landlord makes the premises fit for human habitation
within six months, the withheld rent is then paid to him; if he fails to make the necessary
corrections, the money is returned to the tenant.
21. 384 A.2d at 1239. See DePaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971), in which
it was claimed that the Act impaired contractual obligations and effected a taking of property
without due process of law. The court upheld the Act as a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power. The Act's substantial relationship to the public interest in preserving an ade-
quate supply of housing was found to outweigh the private property interests involved.
22. 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972). In Elderkin, the reason offered for the rejection of
caveat emptor and adoption of the implied warranty was that the purchaser of a new home
must rely upon the skill of the builder and his superior opportunity to examine the suitability
of the home site. rd. at 128, 288 A.2d at 776-77.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-1 to 201-9 (Purdon 1970).
24. 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974). In Monumental Properties, the court interpreted the
Consumer Protection Law to include the leasing of housing in its proscription of "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." See text accompanying
notes 55-56 infra.
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and applied to residential leases by the Courts of Common Pleas of
Columbia25 and Philadelphia 2 Counties.
The majority opinion in Pugh also declared that a lease was a
contract that should be controlled by contract principles.2 The
court maintained that the tenant's obligation to pay rent and the
landlord's obligation to maintain habitable premises were to be
mutually dependent, 21 with standard contract remedies available to
each. Thus, if the landlord sues to recover either possession or un-
paid rent, the tenant can now assert a breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability as a counterzlaiml or a defense.2 The Pugh
court emphasized, however, that if a court discovers no material
breach of the implied warranty of habitability, the defense is unsuc-
cessful and no part of the rental obligation can be suspended, thus
entitling the landlord to judgment for possession and unpaid rent.
Further, the court stated that since a lease is now to be considered
a contract, either party can seek rescission and incidental or conse-
quential damages for a breach.' The court concluded by discussing
several factors, such as the age of the structure and whether the
25. 384 A.2d at 1240. See Edwards v. Watts, No. 74-197 (Pa. C.P. Columbia County, Aug.
19, 1975). In Edwards, the landlord initiated an action against the tenant by filing a com-
plaint in assumpsit for alleged nonpayment of rent. The tenant raised an implied warranty
of habitability as a defense and attempted to offset the landlord's rental claim. In adopting
the implied warranty of habitability, the court acknowledged that they were departing from
traditional landlord-tenant principles, but believed that recent changes supported the aban-
donment of caveat emptor.
26. 384 A.2d at 1240. See Derr v. Cangemi, 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 162 (C.P. Phila. County 1974)
(tenant permitted to recover on implied warranty of habitability theory the difference be-
tween the rental amount she had paid and the actual rental value of the premises during the
lease term).
27. 384 A.2d at 1240.
28. Id. A material breach by one obligor relieves the obligation of the other as lorg as the
breach is not remedied.
29. Id. at 1240-41. The counterclaim permits the tenant to seek reimbursement or a rent
reduction for sums expended for reasonable repairs and replacement to make the Qwelling
habitable, provided that the tenant has given the landlord notice and a reasonable opportun-
ity to repair.
30. Id. at 1240. The defense is successful if the court determines that a material breach
of the implied warranty of habitability has occurred; all or part of the tenant's rental oligation
is thereafter suspended. If the rental obligation is suspended only in part, the tenant must
agree to pay the balance due or the landlord is entitled to a judgment for possession.
31. Id. at 1241. See generally Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 761 (Ind.
App. 1976), where the Indiana court held a landlord liable for all damages available under
contract remedies, including any consequential damages within the Hadley v. Baxendale
guidelines. (Hadley v. Baxendale declared consequential damages to be those that were
within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of contract formation.).
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condition of the leased dwelling violated the housing code, that
courts can look to in determining if a material breach of the lease
has occurred.3"
In his dissent, Judge Price maintained that Pennsylvania law had
not indicated a consistent and inevitable movement toward the
adoption of an implied warranty of habitability.3 He also empha-
sized that since the court had not clearly defined the term
"habitable conditions," varying standards would inevitably be im-
posed by the Pennsylvania courts. Judge Price believed that these
varying standards would impose tremendous burdens on a landlord,
since he cannot possibly anticipate the legal requirements de-
manded of him. 3
The dissent distinguished Elderkin v. Gaster35 by pointing out
that the obligation imposed on the builder-vendor was one to guar-
antee habitability at the time of sale, whereas the implied warranty
as adopted by the majority imposes an ongoing obligation on the
landlord to maintain premises in a habitable condition. 6 Judge
Price concluded by declaring that a decision with such broad impli-
cations should be deferred to the expertise of the legislature. 7
Beginning in 1961 with the Wisconsin decision of Pines v.
Perssion, 31 an increasing number of jurisdictions have undertaken to
expressly reject the doctrine of caveat emptor with respect to mod-
ern leasing agreements and have recognized the existence of an
implied warranty of habitability." Pugh v. Holmes represents Penn-
32. 384 A.2d at 1240. The court also enumerated other factors-namely, the nature and
seriousness of the defect, the effect of the defect on safety and sanitation, and the length of
time the condition has persisted-to be considered by the court in determining whether a
breach is material. The court noted that the list of factors is non-exclusive, and that the lower
court may, in its discretion, consider any other factors it deems appropriate.
33. Id. at 1242. (Price, J., dissenting).
34. Id. Judge Price also perceived this drastic change in landlord-tenant law as imposing
an extreme burden on the judiciary.
35. 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972).
36. 384 A.2d at 1242. (Price, J., dissenting).
37. Id. Holmes' Reply Brief to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County discussed
why the recognition and implementation of an implied warranty of habitability doctrine is
most appropriately the responsibility of the Pennsylvania judiciary and not that of the legisla-
ture. Reply Brief for Appellant at 16, Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
38. 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). In Pines, the Wisconsin court recognized an
implied warranty of habitability, and allowed rescission of the lease and recovery of prepaid
rent. In reaching its decision, the court discussed the exceptions to caveat emptor, the current
legislative concern with adopting housing standards that impose duties on landlords, and the
societal need for adequate housing.
39. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
Vol. 17: 215
Recent Decisions
sylvania's attempt at resolving landlord-tenant problems within the
framework of the common law. The Pugh decision indicates that the
landlord now has a duty not only to initially rent the premises in a
habitable condition, but also to maintain the premises in that con-
dition during the lease term.
Although the Pugh decision is a significant step toward alleviat-
ing many of the recurrent problems that confront today's tenants
when seeking habitable housing, one immediate problem with the
decision emanates from the failure of the superior court to ade-
quately define the parameters of the habitability standard. The
Pugh court did enumerate certain factors which a court must con-
sider when deciding if the implied warranty of habitability has been
breached, including whether the condition violates a housing law,
the nature and seriousness of the defect, the effect of the defect on
safety and sanitation, the length of time for which the condition has
persisted, and the age of the structure. 0 However, the majority spe-
cifically emphasized that the listed factors were not exclusive and
that a court, in its discretion, may consider any other factors it
deems appropriate." Consequently, both landlords and tenants may
encounter problems in determining whether there has actually been
a breach of the implied warranty of habitability under the existing
standard. For example, since tenants now have the legal right to
withhold rental payments, landlords fearing this possibility may
feel pressured to respond to every whim of the tenant. On the other
hand, the tenant must determine not only whether the landlord has
actually breached the implied warranty of habitability, but also to
what extent the implied warranty has been breached in order to
determine the percentage of the monthly rent that can be legally
retained. The Pugh court pointed out that if a court should decide
that no material breach of the implied warranty of habitability
exists, the tenant would not have a valid defense for nonpayment
of rent, and thus the landlord would be entitled to a judgment for
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976); Green
v. Superior Court,. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); King v. Moore-
head, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Foisey v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 222, 515 P.2d 160
(1973); Jack Springs, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791
(Iowa Super. Ct. 1972); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470, reh. denied, 51
Hawaii 478 (1969).
40. 384 A.2d at 1240.
41. Id.
1978-79
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possession and past rent.2
Provided that there has been a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, the Pugh court has afforded the tenant two distinct
remedies to protect his rights under leasing agreements. Pennsyl-
vania's tenants not only have the option to withhold all or a portion
of the monthly rent because of a breach,43 but may also rescind the
lease agreement after vacating the premises." The underlying policy
behind each remedy is to encourage the landlord to maintain the
premises in a habitable condition so that the overall quality of avail-
able residential housing will be improved.
The Pugh court's remedy of allowing a tenant to withhold rental
payments should prove to be the remedy most likely to achieve the
goal of restoring a balanced landlord-tenant relationship and to
effectuate the policy of encouraging landlords to maintain the prem-
ises in a habitable condition. As a practical matter, landlords
clearly do not want their property being occupied by a tenant with-
out receiving compensation in return. Consequently, to avoid this
possibility, the landlord must periodically expend sums to upgrade
the condition of the premises so that it comports with the habitabil-
ity standard.
On the other hand, the remedy of rescission upon vacating the
premises may prove to be of little practical value in encouraging the
landlord to maintain habitable housing. The current housing
shortage virtually ensures a landlord that, as a matter of necessity,
someone will be willing to rent regardless of the condition of the
premises. Moreover,- this remedy may prove to be of little value to
most tenants who either cannot afford the expense of moving, or are
unable to quickly locate an alternative habitable dwelling because
of the existing housing shortage."
42. Id. at 1241. The vague habitability standard espoused by the Pugh court may result
in hardship to many tenants who find themselves without housing as a result of their mis-
taken belief that the implied warranty of habitability has been violated.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. A very recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision, Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa.
Super. 1978), may cause the remedy of rescission to be of greater value in encouraging the
landlord to maintain the leased premises in a habitable condition. In Fair, the tenant initi-
ated a complaint against the landlord nine months after he had vacated the leased dwelling.
The complaint was based upon the landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitability
during the entire term of the lease. The tenant requested a return of all the rent he had paid
during the lease term ($1560) plus $132 for an excessive water bill allegedly caused by the
landlord's failure to repair the water system.
Vol. 17: 215
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Although the Pugh court did not expressly address the issue of
whether the landlord can take measures to induce the tenant to
waive the implied warranty of habitability the court's language
clearly implies that the warranty of habitability cannot be waived.
In adopting the warranty, the court strongly emphasized not only
the existing housing shortage in urban and rural areas, but also the
current inequality of bargaining position between landlord and ten-
ant.4" Clearly, if the implied warranty of habitability can be waived
without strict court scrutiny, the practical significance of Pugh
would be extremely limited and the habitability standard rendered
meaningless, since every landlord would customarily request that
the tenant waive his habitability rights in a standard lease form.
Moreover, the implication in the court's analysis that the warranty
of habitability cannot be waived accords with the majority of court
decisions47 and statutes"8 from other jurisdictions which have indi-
cated that the habitability requirement can only be waived if the
The Fair court held that the implied warranty of habitability could be used as the basis
for a complaint. The Pugh court had allowed it as a defense and a counterclaim. Thus, if
the tenant now proves the landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitability, he can
recover the rental value of the premises during the period that the dwelling remained in an
uninhabitable condition. In addition, the court in Fair determined that if utility bills were
excessive because of the uninhabitable condition of the premises, the tenant should be reim-
bursed for the difference between the amount paid and the amount that would have been
paid in the absence of the uninhabitable condition.
46. 384 A.2d at 1238.
47. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970), where the court of appeals, in dicta, noted that the implied warranty of
habitability should not be waiveable since the housing shortage compels a tenant to accept a
unit notwithstanding observable defects; Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973), where the tenant knew of the defects before he moved in and negotiated a reduction
in rent. The court found this type of bargaining contrary to public policy and to the purpose
of the implied warranty of habitability.
See also Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. 1978), which was decided after Pugh. In
Fair, the superior court directly confronted the issue of whether the implied warranty of
habitability could be waived in a residential lease. The tenant in Fair had signed an Article
of Agreement accepting the leased premises in "as is" condition. The Fair court held that
waiver of the implied warranty of habitability in a residential lease is impermissible since it
violates public policy. Id. at 243.
48. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978) (any agreement by a
tenant to waive or modify his rights is void as contrary to public policy); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §
504.18(1) (West Supp. 1978) ("the parties to a lease of residential premises may not waive or
modify the covenants imposed by this section..."); R.I. GEN. LAws. ANN. § 34-18-16(2)
(1969) (waiver permitted only when the lease is for nine months or longer); WASH. RAv. CODE
§ 59.18.360 (Supp. 1977) (waiver can only occur in writing and where it is not done in a
standard lease form, there is no substantial inequality in bargaining position between the
parties, and public policy is not violated).
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agreement to do so was made at arm's length and was supported by
separate consideration.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Pugh is that it may offer
protection to tenants beyond that provided by the health and safety
standards of the housing code. By refusing to confine Pennsylvania
courts solely to the housing code standard,49 and further by declar-
ing the enumerated factors to be non-exclusive, Pennsylvania courts
now have discretion to consider many other factors, such as the
49. See Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration,
56 B.U.L. Rav. 1, 17-19 (1976), in which the author has divided jurisdictions into categories
based upon their reliance on the housing code in defining habitability.
In the first group, warranty standards seem to require no more or less than housing code
compliance. See, e.g., Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 336, 521 P.2d 304, 309-10 (1974) (the
provisions of the municipal housing code that related to minimum housing standards were
by implication read into and became a part of the rental agreement). Jurisdictions that fall
into this group often find a warranty of habitability in the lease contract by incorporating all
of the statutes and ordinances in effect at the time and place of execution. In each instance,
however, the court has found multiple violations, precluding a determination of whether a
single violation would constitute a breach. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18(1) (West Supp.
1978) (lessor covenants "to maintain the premises in compliance with the applicable health
and safety laws of the state and of the local units of government where the premises are
located during the term of the lease. .. ").
The second group of jurisdictions also relies exclusively on housing code standards, but
demanded of the landlord only substantial compliance with the requirements. See, e.g.,
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)
(court declared that one or two minor violations standing alone which do not affect habitabil-
ity are de minimus and hence would not constitute a breach of the warranty). The rationale
underlying this approach reflects a belief that substantial code compliance would preclude
the existence of conditions violating the habitability standard.
In the third group of jurisdictions, housing code violations are taken into consideration,
but are not used exclusively to determine whether a breach has occurred. See, e.g., Berzito
v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469-70, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973) (the length of time the defect has
persisted, the age of the structure, and the amount of monthly rental payments are among
the court's considerations); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa Super. Ct. 1972)
(court also looks to the age of the structure and the amount of monthly rent as factors in
determining habitability.); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 93, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971) (nature
of the deficiency, length of time it has persisted, the age of the structure and location of the
leased premises are also to be considered by the court.).
In a final group of jurisdictions, the warranty standard is set out without reference to the
housing code. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (1975); N.Y. REAL PRop. LAw § 235-b (McKinney
Supp. 1975-1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (Spec. Pamphlet, West 1978); ORE. REV. STAT. §
91.770 (1974).
The Pugh court's discussion of factors to be considered when determining breach of the
implied warranty of habitability places Pennsylvania within the third group of jurisdictions.
384 A.2d at 1240. See also Derr v. Cangemi, 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 162, 167 (C.P. Philadelphia
County 1974), where the court, in recognizing the implied warranty for the first time in
Pennsylvania, declared that the "very least the landlord should do is to comply with the
standards set by the local housing code." (emphasis added).
1978-79 Recent Decisions 225
amount of monthly rental payments,50 and the location of the prem-
ises,5' in evaluating the habitability requirement. Consideration of
factors such as these apparently permits Pennsylvania's habitabil-
ity standard to be broad enough in scope to protect the reasonable
expectations of all classes of tenants, including those whose monthly
rental payment indicates that they have bargained for much more
than minimum health and safety conditions. Nearly all of today's
tenants are primarily interested in services rather than the underly-
ing land, and are generally incapable of making necessary repairs."
The implementation of a broad habitability standard, coupled with
the majority's discussion of contract law and Pennsylvania's Con-
sumer Protection Law, reflects an awareness that landlord-tenant
relationships have significantly changed, and strongly indicates
that Pugh may ultimately provide protections for all classes of ten-
ants far beyond the confines of the habitability issue.
Furthermore, by declaring that a lease is a contract to be con-
trolled by contract principles,s the Pugh court has clearly reinforced
the idea that all tenants should be able to enforce reasonable expec-
tations of the lease agreement," and to have an appropriate remedy
50. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa Super. Ct. 1972) (the court will consider
the monthly rental amount as one factor in determining if the habitability standard has been
breached); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971) (monthly rental amount is one
of many factors to be considered by the New Hampshire courts); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 144-45, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970), where the court, in attempting to mark the limits of
the landlord's obligation, stated that "the nature of the vital facilities and type of mainte-
nance and repairs required is limited and governed by the type of property rented and the
amount of rent reserved."
51. See Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971) (court took into account the
neighborhood in which the leased dwelling was located as a factor in determining the habita-
bility standard).
52. With few exceptions, the landlord-tenant relationship is based upon a standard resi-
dential lease form developed by real estate interests. The City of Pittsburgh Housing Court
has estimated that in Allegheny County, over 90% of the realtors utilize the same lease
drafted by the county realtors' association. Many of the provisions in the standard lease form
are rarely modified for any tenant: they include 1) a confession of judgment clause for any
unpaid rent; 2) a provision for distraint; 3) a waiver of the tenants' rights under the Landlord-
Tenant Act of 1952; 4) a clause accelerating the rent due for the entire lease term if a default
in rent payment occurs; 5) a provision for a charging the tenant with costs and attorney's
fees associated with recovering any rent due; 6) an exculpatory clause releasing the landlord
from tort liability to third parties for defective conditions on the premises; 7) a clause requir-
ing a deposit applicable to any damage done by the tenant; 8) a clause forbidding subletting
without the consent of the landlord; 9) a waiver of notice to surrender possession of the
premises; and 10) a clause permitting the landlord to evict the tenant upon a default in rent
payments without a judicial hearing.
53. 384 A.2d at 1240.
54. By expressly declaring that a lease is a contract that should be controlled by contract
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for breaches thereof. After Pugh, Pennsylvania courts can, in ac-
cordance with contract principles, consider the circumstances and
subject matter surrounding the leasing agreement to determine the
intent and expectations of the parties. Regardless of whether it is
construed as an express term of the written contract, or as a circum-
stance of the leasing, a substantial rental payment indicates that
the tenant expects to be provided with much more than the mini-
mum housing code requirements. If the desired goal is to restore a
balanced landlord-tenant relationship, a landlord should not be
heard to argue that such an expectation is unreasonable or not
within the contemplation of both parties.
Finally, both the Pugh and Monumental Properties55 decisions
indicate that the policies underlying the Pennsylvania Consumer
Protection Law extend to the consumer in housing situations.
Moreover, Monumental Properties had held that the landlord can
be required to explain the fine print provisions in leases or to change
the provisions entirely so that they can be easily comprehended by
the average tenant. Consequently, after Pugh and Monumental
Properties, it seems clear that courts will closely scrutinize residen-
tial leasing agreements to insure that all protections are afforded the
Pennsylvania housing consumer in his search for habitable housing.
The immediate significance of the Pennsylvania Superior Court's
decision is evident in the court's determined refusal to perpetuate
the evils of caveat emptor in today's modern residential leasing
situations. Although increased litigation will be necessary to define
the parameters of the habitability standard in Pennsylvania, it is
principles, Pugh reinforced the earlier Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of McDanel v.
Mack Realty, 315 Pa. 174, 172 A. 97 (1934), in which the court treated a lease with express
covenants as a contract. The Pugh court's declaration also reinforced the recent Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision in Greenfiell & Co. v. Kolea, 380 A.2d 758 (Pa. 1977) (upon acciden-
tal destruction of the leased building by fire, the lessee's duty to pay rent was relieved based
upon the contract principle of impossibility of performance of the lease agreement).
55. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450,329 A.2d 812 (1974). The
state Attorney General brought an action against twenty-five landlords alleging 1) that the
use of "lengthy, complex leases containing archaic and technical language beyond the easy
comprehension of the ordinary consumer constituted an unfair and deceptive act or practice,
2) that inclusion of certain provisions in the printed forms was unfair and deceptive, and 3)
that failure to include in the form leases notice to tenant of his statutory rights was misleading
and confusing."
Noting the housing shortage and the unequal economic position of landlord and tenant,
the Monumental Properties court believed that a failure to afford the housing consumer the
sante protections afforded the consumer of other goods was unwarranted.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 to 201-9 (Purdon 1971).
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clear that Pennsylvania has made a complete break with the legal
principles of the agrarian world and that the Pennsylvania courts
are willing to explore new avenues in determining the rights and
obligations in the landlord-tenant relationship.
Angeline Straka

